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Abstract
We study decision making processes with non-standard all-pay structures. In our ﬁrst group of
applications, individual members of some institution—due to public pressure or expectation—
propose reductions of their own income, e.g., corporate board members reducing their bonus
payments in an economic downturn, or politicians who reduce their expense allowances after
some scandal. In such situations, the most aggressive proposal might carry the day and win
public credibility or moral kudos for the proposer. Everyone, however, suﬀers the cost of that
winning proposal. In the second group of applications, all participants bear the total cost
of all bids as, e.g., under the ﬁlibuster strategy of delaying legislative action. The common
features of these situations are a winner-take-all structure, non-standard payment rules, and
nonvoluntary participation. We ﬁnd that, in the equilibria of these games, everybody suﬀers
a loss (with the possible exception of the winner).
(JEL C7, D7. Keywords: Auctions, Contests, Truth-telling.)
1 Introduction
We analyse decision making processes with all-pay structures which are diﬀerent from the classic all-
pay auction or war-of-attrition settings. Our main idea is to explore situations where decision makers
take actions against their own narrow self interest because background ‘participation’ considerations
force them to maintain public goodwill. In our ﬁrst class of applications we consider situations where
decision makers of some institution ﬁnd themselves under public pressure to reevaluate the status quo
regarding, e.g., excessive bonus payments, expense allowances, subsidies, or vacation regulations.
Situations might be conceivable in which public scrutiny forces decision makers to accept the most
stringent proposal, conveying on the proposer a gain in public credibility.1 This public esteem may
arise from the proposer’s connection with the righteous policy while competing, less daring proposals
may be forgotten. Another example involving only a subset of the public is the US debate on a deal
to raise the federal debt ceiling of July 2011. There, threatened withdrawal of support by parts of
∗Thanks to Peter Simmons and Bipasa Datta for helpful comments. †Microeconomics, Technische Universit¨ at
Berlin, Str. des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany, thomas.giebe@tu-berlin.de. ‡Department of Economics,
University of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD, United Kingdom, paul.schweinzer@york.ac.uk. (12-Dec-2011)
1 “The criminal justice system has become a tool of the Kremlin and its commercial allies. Russians of all sorts
loathe such cronyism. Both Mr Putin and Mr Medvedev have talked about tackling graft, but done nothing. If they
took action, they would lose some power, but win kudos.” (The Economist, The Cracks Appear, 10-Dec-2011)the Republican Tea party basis can be argued to have led the Republican side into a similar position:
“the G.O.P. has just demonstrated its willingness to risk ﬁnancial collapse unless it gets everything
its most extreme members want.”2 At any rate, in our examples, all participants sustain the cost
of the winning proposal. Importantly, in these situations, nonparticipation (in a public debate or
the vote of a corporate board) might either be inconsequential if players are bound to the decision
anyway or may lead to direct and prohibitively large payoﬀ consequences. We model this type of
situation as an all-pay auction where the highest bid wins and all participants pay that winning bid.
We ﬁnd that, in the symmetric equilibrium, there is systematic overbidding, i.e., either all players
make a loss or only the winner can avoid a loss.3
In the second class of applications, we study all-pay structures where all participants pay (a
function of) the sum of all eﬀorts. An example is ﬁlibustering, the parliamentary tactic of extended
speechmaking, typically employed for the purpose of delaying legislative action or ‘talking out a
bill’.4 This payment rule allows the study of decision making processes where through perseverance,
extended speaking, etc, players try to convince each other to follow their respective lead, or, simply, to
frustrate the others’ proposals. In the end one player (or group of players) wins while all participants
bear the total cost of all participants’ eﬀort, e.g., in terms of time or loss of reputation in the public
opinion. Again, voluntary participation is not an issue, since the single decision that we study is part
of a larger game in which the players have overwhelming incentives to participate.
We analyse these applications in the framework of uniform-price versions of the classic war of
attrition. Formally, a two-player war of attrition is equivalent to a second-price all-pay auction in
which the highest bidder wins the prize, and both players pay the loser’s bid. In the ﬁrst ‘expenses’
application discussed above, we use an all-pay auction where all players pay the highest bid. In the
second ‘ﬁlibuster’ application we use an all-pay-all auction where each player’s payment depends on
the sum of all bids.
In both cases we ﬁnd that, for certain distributions of valuations, the symmetric equilibrium we
derive exhibits truthful bidding, i.e., players bid their true valuations. This implies that the winner’s
equilibrium proﬁt is zero while everyone else suﬀers a loss. In order to shed more light on these
truth-telling results, we study payment rules which are more general than those described above.
In the symmetric equilibria of the games we study we generally ﬁnd that all players suﬀer a loss,
possibly with the exception of the winner. The details depend on the distribution of valuations and
the number of players. It is well known in the literature that rent-seeking behaviour may lead to
welfare losses. An example are young graduates who are attracted by the large bonuses paid in the
ﬁnancial sector although they might be socially more gainfully employed elsewhere.5 Viewed from
this angle and focusing on situations where a reduction in the decision makers’ payoﬀs is welfare-
2 Paul Krugman, The President Surrenders, op-ed, New York Times, 31-Jul-2011.
3 An economic application of this idea is advertising on the basis of (diﬀerentiated) Bertrand price competition.
For instance, Google’s strategy of providing free, web-based email and oﬃce-application services has the same
ﬂavour of binding competitors to their lowest price oﬀer.
4 One of the ﬁrst known practitioners of the ﬁlibuster was the Roman senator Cato the Younger. In debates over
legislation proposed by Julius Caesar, Cato obstructed the measure by speaking continuously until nightfall. As
the Roman Senate had a rule requiring all business to conclude by dusk, Cato’s purposefully long-winded speeches
were an eﬀective device to forestall a vote.
5 For details and a wealth of further applications of the basic ideas of our model, see Frank and Cook (1995).
2increasing, a result of our simple auction-theoretic model is that forcing the players to debate in
public and rewarding the most aggressive proposal may improve welfare although decision makers
independently maximise their own payoﬀs.
It appears that situations with the general ﬂavour outlined in our examples have not previously
been studied formally. Moreover, it may come as a surprise that a small modiﬁcation of the well-
studied all-pay auction framework can be used to characterise the main strategic incentives players
face in this type of interaction.
Literature
Our paper relates to the study of all-pay auction games. In a ﬁrst-price all-pay auction, each player
pays their own bid, with the prize being awarded to the highest bidder. There are not too many refer-
ences to this concept in the recent literature. The ones that we are aware of were made by Krishna
and Morgan (1997), Hopkins and Kornienko (2007), Kaplan, Luski, Sela, and Wettstein (2002),
and Klose and Kovenock (2011a) as well as by Konrad (2008) in the survey literature. Krishna
and Morgan (1997) study the standard, second-prize war of attrition, both Hopkins and Kornienko
(2007) and Kaplan, Luski, Sela, and Wettstein (2002) explore pricing rules which are diﬀerent from
ours, and Klose and Kovenock (2011a) is a study under complete information. Although Klose and
Kovenock (2011b) investigate a similar theme as we do—that extremism can sometimes drive out
moderation—both their analysis and research questions are wholly diﬀerent. G¨ uth and van Damme
(1986) and Amann and Leininger (1996) discuss hybrid versions between the ﬁrst- and second-price
sealed-bid all-pay auctions. In this hybrid format, the prize is won by the highest bidder but the
loser pays her bid while the winner pays a convex combination of her own and the losers bid. The
type of auction we consider relates to those with externalities; for recent contributions to this ﬁeld
see Maasland and Onderstal (2007) or, again, Klose and Kovenock (2011a).
The two papers which are closest to our analysis are Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (2005) and
Goeree and Turner (2000). The latter introduce the all-pay-all auction format—in which all bidders
pay a weighted sum of all bids—as optimal format when all bidders receive some share of the amount
of money raised. Thus, each bidder has an incentive to drive up the price because every participant
receives a ﬁxed share of the auction’s revenue. The paper by Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (2005)
studies litigation systems. As in our paper, their payoﬀs are functions of players’ expenditures. They
study so called fee-shifting rules which are relevant in the legal context. Our payment rules, however,
violate their assumption (A3) ‘internalised legal cost,’ which says that each individual eﬀort is borne
by exactly one party.
To the best of our knowledge, however, the uniform pricing rules in all-pay auctions presented
in this paper have not been previously studied in the literature. In particular, our ﬁnding that truth-
telling can be an equilibrium feature of the war of attrition in certain environments is a novelty.
32 The model
There is a set N of n > 1 risk-neutral, ex-ante identical bidders i ∈ N who each value an object
at θi.6 These valuations are privately known; all the opponents and the auctioneer know is the
symmetric distribution F(θ)[0,1], with strictly positive density f(θ) = F ′(θ), from which valuations
are drawn. We denote order statistics as follows: The k-th highest of s independent draws from
cdf F is Θ(k:s) and its distribution is denoted by F (k:s). Admissible bids are positive; a zero bid is
interpreted as nonparticipation. In that case, a bidder realises the symmetric and commonly known
outside option ¯ u ∈ (−∞,∞).
We model our ﬁrst ‘expenses’ application as an all-pay auction where every participant pays (a
fraction of) the highest bid. Thus, all participants are bound by the decision of the player who is
willing to bear the largest cost. This player wins and realises her valuation. For our second ‘ﬁlibuster’
application, we analyse an all-pay auction where every participant pays (a function of) the sum of
all bids. Thus, each participant suﬀers from the combined eﬀort of all participants. For both games,
we derive the symmetric equilibrium. A feature of these arising equilibria is that, under certain
conditions, equilibrium bids exhibit truth-telling (i.e., bidding the true valuation is an equilibrium).
It is important for our analysis that the public takes an interest in the decisions being taken.
Otherwise decision makers may well reach a more beneﬁcial outcome by colluding. As argued
in the introduction and for the situations described there, it is a natural assumption that players
ﬁnd it in their interest to participate in our auctions. Nevertheless, for our ﬁrst game, we spell
out the equilibrium for all symmetric outside options. For the second game, we only derive the
full-participation case and the corresponding truthful bidding result.
3 Example
Consider an auction where the highest bidder wins and every participant pays this bid. Consider
player i ∈ N, with n = 2, and index the opponent by j = 3 − i. (In this example we assume that
the players’ equilibrium bidding function β(θi) is monotonic.) Being of type θi ∈ [0,1], player i



















f(θj)dθj = 0 (2)
6 In the interpretation of (most of) our examples, this is the value the individual attaches to public approval.




























which, for the special case of Uniform valuations, F(θ) = θ, implies truth-telling, β(θi) = θi.
4 Analysis
4.1 Everyone pays (a fraction of) the largest bid
In the following, we analyse the all-pay auction game where all bidders pay the same constant fraction
α > 0 of the largest bid. The symmetric equilibrium of this auction can be characterised as follows.
For suﬃciently low outside options, there is full participation and bidders employ monotonic bidding
functions, for suﬃciently high outside options there is no participation, while for an intermediate
range of outside options, bidders participate and the bid is monotonic only if bidders’ valuations
exceed a threshold value ˆ θ. The function Π(ˆ θ,θi) is the expected equilibrium auction payoﬀ of a
bidder with valuation θi > ˆ θ where outside options are such that only players with valuations above
ˆ θ participate. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1. Consider the uniform-price all-pay auction, with symmetric outside options, ¯ u ∈
(−∞,∞), where all bidders pay the fraction α > 0 of the highest bid. Bidders issuing positive bids
participate in the auction while a player who bids zero receives her outside option. The auction has
a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium as follows. Deﬁne










where ˆ θ = ˆ θ(¯ u) is the lowest valuation bidder who participates in the auction. The above payoﬀ
depends on the outside option and is implicitly deﬁned by ¯ u = Π(ˆ θ, ˆ θ). The equilibrium bidding
7 Given full participation, this boundary condition is intuitive: If the valuation is zero, then winning has no upside.
Thus, the zero type would focus on minimising payments: By making the lowest feasible bid, the bidder minimises
the price in the event of winning. This does not hold if there is a nonnegative outside option, in which case a
low-value player might prefer not to participate. Also note that (4) might not exist for all distributions. See the
discussion of Proposition 1.
5function is
β(θi, ¯ u) =

   












F(s)ds if Π(0,0) < ¯ u < 1 and θi > ˆ θ
0 if ¯ u ≥ 1 or Π(0,0) < ¯ u < 1 and θi ≤ ˆ θ.
(6)
Note that (6) might not exist for all distributions. As long as the inverse elasticity of the
distribution f(s)s/F(s) converges for s → 0, however, the equilibrium exists. Perhaps surprisingly,
for certain parameters, this symmetric equilibrium exhibits truthful bidding. For example, under the
uniform distribution and suﬃciently small outside options (i.e., α = n − 1 and ¯ u ≤ −(n − 1)2/n),
all players participate and bid their true valuations.
Lemma 1 (Truthful bidding). If F(θ) = θα/(n−1), and ¯ u ≤ −α2/(1 + α), then in the symmetric
equilibrium, all players bid their valuations, β(θi) = θi.
It is easy to show that this truth-telling result extends to the case of asymmetric outside options
as long as it is common knowledge that all outside options are below the level given in Lemma
1. Moreover, it is as easy to see that the equilibrium might exhibit overbidding by all players.
For example, if F(θ) = θk, where k > α/(n − 1) and ¯ u suﬃciently small, we have β(θi) =
(k(n − 1)/α)θi > θi.
4.2 The price as a function of all bids
We now turn to the second set of applications, modelled as an all-pay-all auction where all bidders pay
the sum of all bids. Again, we analyse a slightly more general payment rule in order to generalise our
truthful bidding result in Lemma 2. In order to simplify the presentation, we ignore the participation
issue in this subsection (see the introduction for a discussion). Thus, although in principle we could
follow the same route as in the previous subsection and explicitly model outside options, here all
players make nonnegative bids and fully participate by assumption.
Proposition 2. Consider an auction where every bidder pays a function of all bids, α
 n
j=1(bj)k,
with α,k > 0, where bj is bidder j’s bid. Given full participation, the auction has a symmetric














As in the previous subsection, we obtain a truthful bidding result here as well. As an example,
consider the uniform distribution. There, the parameters k = n and α = (n − 1)/n implement
truth-telling.
Lemma 2 (Truthful bidding). If F(θ) = θt, with t > 0, and the auction parameters are k =
t(n − 1) + 1 and α = (k − 1)/k, then the equilibrium exhibits truth-telling β(θ) = θ.
6Again, it is not hard to see that the bidding equilibrium in Proposition 2 as well as the truth-
telling result hold for any (a)symmetric outside options as long as it is common knowledge that all
outside options are suﬃciently unattractive to ensure full participation. As in the previous model,
equilibrium overbidding is easily obtained, e.g. by choosing α suﬃciently small for given n. The
proof is similar to that of Lemma 2 above: Just replace the equality sign in (22) by “<” and maintain
k = t(n − 1) + 1. Then overbidding is obtained for α < t(n − 1)/(t(n − 1) + 1). The rhs of that
inequality approaches 1 for large n.
5 Conclusion
We employ uniform-price versions of the well-studied all-pay auction model under symmetric in-
dependent private valuations to study situations where all players pay either (a function of) the
winner’s bid or (a function of) the sum of all bids. We ﬁnd that in the symmetric equilibria of the
games we study, all players—with the possible exception of the winner—make a loss, depending on
the distribution of values and the number of participants.
We ﬁnd that both speciﬁcations of the auction admit truthful bidding in equilibrium for certain
distributions of valuations. Our study of the ﬁrst set of applications is motivated by decision making
problems where public opinion forces players to compete on the reduction of own income. The
second setting applies to problems where the player with the most stamina succeeds and every
participant suﬀers the participants’ combined eﬀort costs.
There is a well known argument that the availability of excessive rents, e.g. due to bonus
payments in the ﬁnancial sector, attract too much talent from a welfare perspective. A policy impli-
cation of our ﬁndings is that, if a reduction of the decision makers’ income increases welfare, then
an open debate and a reward of the most aggressive proposal—for instance, through an increased
probability of reelection—might achieve a welfare improvement even though the decision is a re-
sult of independent utility maximisation by the participants. This, of course, speaks in favour of
transparency and public scrutiny of decision making processes.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. If ¯ u ≥ 1, the outside option is superior to the auction, for all players.
Thus, β(θi, ¯ u) = 0, see (6). In the following, we restrict attention to ¯ u ∈ (−∞,1).
Suppose there is a symmetric equilibrium where all bidders bid zero (and take their outside
options) if their valuations are below the common threshold value ˆ θ. If their valuations exceed this
value, then they bid according to a strictly monotonic bidding function. We ﬁrst determine this
bidding function, taking the threshold value ˆ θ ∈ [0,1] as given. We start by considering bidder i’s
decision problem when her value exceeds the threshold value, θi > ˆ θ. W.l.o.g. we only consider i’s
7positive bids ˜ β(z) for z ∈ (ˆ θ,1]. Bidder i’s expected proﬁt is
πi(z,θi) = F (1:n−1)(z)(θi − αβ(z)) − (1 − F (1:n−1)(z))E[αβ(Θ(1:n−1)|Θ(1:n−1) > z]

































This corresponds to the terms in the ﬁrst two cases of (6) (with ˆ θ = 0 in the ﬁrst case). The
candidate (6) says that if i’s value is below ˆ θ then i should bid zero. We now turn attention to i’s
expected proﬁt if she follows (9) and θi > ˆ θ.
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After reinserting (A) into (10) and straightforward simpliﬁcation, we obtain
πi(ˆ θ,θi) = F












      
=(F n−1(t))′t
dt. (12)
Integrating the last term by parts, we get






















which equals Π(ˆ θ,θi) in (5). Thus, (9) is an equilibrium only if Π(ˆ θ,θi) is superior to the outside
option for all valuations θ ∈ [ˆ θ,1]. Since Π(ˆ θ,θi) is strictly increasing in the valuation θi (only the
8last term in Π(ˆ θ,θi) is a function of the valuation), it must hold that Π(ˆ θ, ˆ θ) ≥ ¯ u in order for (9)
to be an equilibrium bid. Moreover, Π(ˆ θ, ˆ θ) must not exceed the outside option since otherwise
positive bids are proﬁtable even for some valuations below ˆ θ. Thus, the equilibrium threshold value
must satisfy Π(ˆ θ, ˆ θ) = ¯ u.
Note that






is increasing in ˆ θ (recall that ˆ θ ∈ [0,1]). Thus, by Π(ˆ θ, ˆ θ) = ¯ u, the threshold value is increasing
in the value of the outside option. In turn, for suﬃciently low outside option, the threshold value
is zero. The critical outside option is implicitly given by Π(0,0) = ¯ u. Thus, for ¯ u ≤ Π(0,0), the
threshold value is zero and there is full participation in the auction for all players and valuations.
It remains to discuss ‘intermediate’ outside options, deﬁned by Π(0,0) ≤ ¯ u < 1. For these
outside options the equilibrium threshold value is in the range ˆ θ ∈ (0,1). Thus, bidders with
valuations θi ≤ ˆ θ take their outside options, while all higher valuations θi > ˆ θ participate in the
auction with bids according to (9). Thus, we have completed the derivation of the equilibrium
candidate. It remains to be shown that (9) does not only satisfy the foc of i’s best response
problem but that it is indeed a maximiser for θi > ˆ θ.
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(15)
Interchanging the order of integration, the term (A) can be written as:
(A) = (n − 1)
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.
9Note, that only (C) depends on z. Thus,





′(k − θ)dk. (18)
Since this is strictly positive for all z  = θ, where z,θ ∈ [0,1], this completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1. With F(s) = sα/(n−1), we have sf(s)/F(s) = α/(n−1). Then the ﬁrst case
of (6) straightforwardly simpliﬁes to β(θi, ¯ u) = θi. Similarly, replace tf(t)/F(t) in (5) by α/(n−1),
simplify, and solve ¯ u = Π(0,0).
Proof of Proposition 2. Obviously, (7) is strictly monotonic increasing. Suppose player i’s rivals
bid according to (7). W.l.o.g. we only consider bidder i’s deviating bids β(z) where z ∈ [0,1].
Bidder i’s expected payoﬀ is (recall that F (1:n−1) = F n−1)
πi(z,θ) = F n−1(z)θ − αβk(z) − α(n − 1)E[β(Θ)k],
∂πi(z,θ)
∂z
= (F n−1(z))′θ − (αβk(z))′.
(19)














As a proof of suﬃciency, we show that πi(θ,θ) > πi(z,θ) for all z ∈ [0,1], z  = θ. Inserting the
candidate in (19), we get


























 ′(θ − s)ds > 0.
(21)
Proof of Lemma 2. Inserting F(s) = st into the rhs of (7) and setting the term equal to θ
















t(n − 1) + 1
θ
t(n−1)+1. (22)
This equation is satisﬁed if we insert the proposed α = (k − 1)/k and k = t(n − 1) + 1.
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